The killing of Iranian General Qassem Suleimani has triggered the writing of a plethora of op-eds and think-pieces. Many of these make bold predictions without, in fact, providing a great deal of factual basis to support them. In reality, it is impossible to forecast the course of events going forward; it is critical to understand decision making within the Iranian system is a complex and opaque process involving a range of important actors. Thus, regardless of the confidence of most media-pundits in their own conclusions, predicting what happens next is far from easy.

When won by multiple independent and opposing organizations, revolutions usually create more confusion and discord than what was overthrown. This situation is even more difficult when tribal and regional loyalties exacerbate the forming of a country-wide central government.

It is clear that the Israeli political system has reached a peak in terms of the challenges it faces: two elections campaigns to date this year have not led to conclusive results and a third round may be right around the corner. The explanations for the current situation are varied and include, among others, internal difficulties with the election method itself (which is not a direct election), the hostility and distrust between party leaders (similar to the situation in the U.S. and other countries), the legal situation of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and more. However, even if there are difficulties and challenges in running a state under such circumstances, the fact is that the state itself continues to function well. But what needs to be done to resolve this situation? Politicians need to show flexibility and take responsibility.

When Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini announced his vision of exporting the Islamist revolution to the region, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) developed the winning strategy of sponsoring Shiite militias to act as proxies. In 1982 the IRGC created Hezbollah in Lebanon, a model proxy. After the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, the IRGC and its foreign operations branch, the Quds Force (QF), set up a large number of Shiite militias under the umbrella of the Hashd al Shaabi, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The Iranian influence became so pervasive that Qassem Suleimani, the QF chief, became known as the “viceroy of Iraq.”

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Though largely motivated by mutual concerns about surging Iranian imperialism, the strengthening of Israel’s relationship with the GCC monarchies could ultimately help reignite the stalled Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

Published back in April, the most recent special issue of Israel Studies hit a nerve so raw that it is still reverberating in the pages of online journals and newspapers. As co-editors of this publication, who conceived of the project “Word Crimes: Reclaiming the Language of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” came up with the admittedly “stark and provocative” title, and solicited the contributing essays – we are flattered by the attention but dismayed by how many readers continue to prefer uncivil denunciations of the volume’s editors and contributors over rigorous analysis and engaging with the substance of the essays themselves.